Tactical evolution is supposed to be a gradual process, but in 2016/17 Antonio Conte’s 3-4-2-1 went viral - and the Premier League clunked into an entirely new gear. It was, fittingly, a rather graceless transition for a country where monetary power has bleached out the subtleties of tactical development found in mainland Europe.
That 16 Premier League clubs mimicked Conte’s formation within six months of its emergence signifies the dearth of ideas in English football, but it also highlights a collective desperation to break free from the claustrophobia and homogeneity that has clung to the Premier League ever since we began fetishising possession football at the beginning of the decade.
Since then, defensive lines have pushed higher; wingers have drifted inwards; and a growing obsession with statistics has caused English football to slowly congeal into a harmless gloop, culminating in its irrelevance on the European stage and a staggeringly inept 2015/16 domestically - for all but Leicester City. The Premier League was crying out for an updated theory, and so when Conte discovered the antidote last year it resonated with just about everyone. Even Jose Mourinho - the most stubborn and unadaptable of managers - is now musing over its value at Manchester United.
And well he should. Not only is the United squad already perfectly stocked to benefit from such a switch, but the change would instantaneously solve the most alarming tactical flaws exhibited by the club since Sir Alex Ferguson’s retirement.
Upon his arrival, Mourinho promised to wake Old Trafford from its three-year nightmare, but unstitching Louis van Gaal’s methods has been a more grueling task than anticipated. Under the Dutchman - whose ultra-fluid Ajax and arthritic United have neatly bookended the era of possession football - United were gradually submerged into the sludge of an outdated pass-pass-pass philosophy. Mourinho has, so far, been unable to shake them from their slumber.
Granted, in 2016/17 there were brief flashes of rotational, inventive movement, but only when United’s wingers shunned their duties and drifted infield, overloading the centre and creating one-touch triangles. When Jesse Lingard or Juan Mata arced in from the touchline, suddenly Paul Pogba would come alive, Ander Herrera would stutter forward, and United swirled forward like a team with a purpose.
Switching to a 3-4-2-1, with its innovative use of a double playmaker, would allow United to consistently play in this manner, since Lingard, Mata, Henrikh Mkhitaryan, Pogba, and Marcus Rashford all excel in central attacking midfield. In short, such a dramatic rejig would exploit their excess of riches in the middle, while providing additional close support for Romelu Lukaku, whose meagre contribution outside the penalty area is well documented.
What’s more, the fluidity of those inside forwards means counter-attacking from deep becomes considerably easier, which - given time - could bring back the surging breakaway power Old Trafford witnessed during their greatest Fergie incarnation. Carlos Tevez, Cristiano Ronaldo, and Wayne Rooney used to hurtle forward like Chelsea did last campaign, using precisely the tactical mantra that has defined Mourinho’s career.
In fact, the deeper you look the more a three-defender system makes perfect sense. United possess a host of stockily-talented, but slow, central defenders who would surely excel with two partners rather than one; Antonio Valencia and Luke Shaw are natural wing-backs; and Rashford and Lukaku could forge a traditional little-and-large partnership up-front should Mourinho need to add firepower late in a match, easily switching from 3-4-2-1 to 3-5-2.
Only in the Premier League - where sledgehammer wealth bludgeons innovation - could a tactical reshuffle cause such an earthquake. But Conte's discovery is poignant. His 3-4-2-1 recognises that central attacking midfield is the key battleground in modern football and deliberately exploits the frailties of a 4-2-3-1. Mourinho possesses the right players and the right counter-attacking instincts to replicate his rival’s tactical philosophy. He’d be foolish not to give it a try.
